part appear to have given a liberal interpretation to the concept of "single subject" and have rejected most single-subject challenges to state legislation. 17 Even with the uptick in findings of violations in recent decades, 18 the meaning of the rule remains murky, with the case law consisting of a mix of unpredictable "I know it when I see it" decisions. 19 Due to the slipperiness of subject, many analyses have focused on what are regularly said to be the primary purposes of the rulethe prevention of legislative logrolling and riders, and the promotion of a more orderly and informed legislative process --and have called for reframing the enforcement of the rule around the advancement of these goals. But determining whether a law is the product of logrolling, or whether a provision should be treated as a rider, will often be difficult. Moreover, it is far from clear that logrolls and riders are as pernicious as proponents of more vigorous enforcement of the single subject rule assume. So, too, the more aggressive use of the single-subject rule urged by advocates as a means of thwarting "legislative chicanery" 20 and "backroom politics" 21 could also undo the cooperation and compromise necessary to get difficult but important legislation enacted. 17 The leading study of the first century of the single-subject rule is Millard H. Ruud, No Law Shall Embrace More than One Subject, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 389 (1958) . Professor Ruud concluded that "the one-subject rule . . . appears as a weak and undependable arrow in [the] quiver" of anyone challenging state legislation. Id. at 447. Nearly sixty years later, another comprehensive study similarly concluded that "most states have . . . given little weight to their respective single subject rules. Justin W. Evans 19 Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 20 Denning & Smith, supra, 78 Tenn. L. Rev. at 832. 21 Note, Tipping Point: Missouri's Single Subject Provision, 72 Mo. L. Rev. 1387 Rev. , 1389 Rev. (2007 .
Part II of this article briefly reviews the history and purposes behind the singlesubject rule. Part III examines how state courts have applied the single-subject rule, with particular attention to some recent state supreme court single-subject cases interpreting the rule. Part IV focuses on arguments for reframing enforcement of the rule more tightly around its purposes, particular the goals of preventing logrolling or riders. Part V concludes by reflecting of the significance of the failure of the rule to achieve its goal of reforming state legislative processes.
II.
The History and Purposes of the Single-Subject Rule
A. History
Scholars have traced concerns about omnibus legislation and the norm of requiring laws to be limited to a single subject to the Lex Cecilia Didia of the Roman Republic. 22 Early instances of single-subject requirements in the American setting include a complaint by the Privy Council about the practices of the legislature of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, 23 and a 1702 directive of Queen Anne to the royal governor of the New Jersey colony against the adoption of laws "intermixing in one Act" unrelated subjects. 24 The constitutions --federal and stateadopted after the Revolution did not include a singlesubject requirement. But that soon changed. The early nineteenth century witnessed growing popular discontent with the performance of state legislatures, including such abuses as "[l]ast-minute consideration of important measures, logrolling, mixing substantive provisions in omnibus bills, low visibility and hasty enactment of important, 22 See, e.g., Robert Luce, Legislative Procedure: Parliamentary Practices and the Course of Business in the Framing of Statutes 548 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1922 ). 23 Id. at 549. 24 Id. and sometimes corrupt legislation, and the attachment of unrelated provisions in the amendment process." 25 In response, the states amended their constitutions to impose new constraints on their legislatures. Some of these were substantive, such as limits on state spending, lending, and borrowing intended to prevent the practices that got many states into fiscal difficulties in the 1830s and 1840s. 26 Others were procedural, and were intended to promote legislative accountability and deliberation. These included, inter alia, requirements that votes be reflected in the legislature's journal; that no bill be altered during the legislative process so as to change its legislative purpose; that bills must "age" a certain number of days before they can be voted on; that each bill have a title clearly disclosing its subjectand that each bill be limited to a single subject. 27 Illinois was the first to adopt a single-subject requirement when it amended its constitution in 1818 to direct that bills appropriating salaries for government officials be limited to that subject. Michigan in 1843 limited laws authorizing the borrowing of money or the issuance of state stock to a single object. In 1844, New Jersey adopted the first general single-subject requirement. 28 There are some variations across the states' constitutions in the language and scope of the rule. Two states apply the requirement only to appropriations bills, and another two states limit it to bills adopting special or local laws. 30 Conversely, a few states exempt appropriations bills from the single-subject requirement, 31 and some states exclude bills "for the codification, revision, or rearrangement of laws." 32 A handful of states use the term "object" rather than "subject," although that does not appear to have had any legal significance. 33 Notwithstanding these variations, some version of the single-subject requirement is widespread, with roughly three-quarters of state legislatures subject to the rule for most enactments. It is probably the "most significant and most litigated procedural requirement" in state constitutions. 34 The language of the Ohio Constitution is typical: "No bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." 35
B. Purposes
The purposes of the single-subject rule are briefly stated and often repeated: the prevention of logrolling and riders; orderly legislative procedure that promotes informed legislative decision-making and public accountability; 36 and, less frequently, the protection of the governor's veto power. 37 most frequently cited as the "evils" against which the single-subject rule" is aimed. 38 The two terms are sometimes blurred together, 39 but they refer to somewhat different forms of legislative action. "Logrolling" is used to describe what occurs when two or more separate proposals, none of which is able to command majority support, are combined so that the minorities behind each measure aggregate to a majority capable of passing the resulting bill. 40 A "rider" is a provision which could not pass on its own but is then attached to a bill considered likely to pass and so "rides" on that more popular measure to enactment. 41 Both logrolling and riders have been sharply criticized because they lead to the adoption of measures that do not enjoy true majority support within the legislature, and, to the extent that legislators accurately represent the views of their constituents, within the state as a whole. Some courts have also emphasized the degree to which logrolls and riders interfere with the freedom of legislators by presenting them with the "Hobson's choice" of being "forced to assent to an unfavorable provision to secure passage of a 38 , J., dissenting) ("both case law and legislative history make clear that this provision must be understood as directed against two specific evils: 1) increasing voting power by combining measures that could not be carried on their individual merits, . . . and 2) surprising voters by surreptitiously including unknown and alien subjects 'coiled up in the folds' of the proposal") (application of single-subject rule to ballot proposition). 39 (Ohio 1994 ) (Francis E. Sweeney, Sr., J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); Dragich, supra, 38 Harv. J. Legis. at 161 (analyzing a case in which it was "hard to say" whether a singlesubject violation involved a logroll or a rider). favorable one, or conversely, forced to vote against a favorable provision to ensure that an unfavorable provision is not enacted." 42 Beyond the prevention of logrolling and riders, many courts and commentators cite improved legislative deliberation, greater transparency, and the resulting greater accountability to the public as purposes of the single-subject rule. 43 As the Illinois Supreme Court recently explained, one reason for the single-subject rule "is to promote an orderly legislative process. . .. 'By limiting each bill to a single subject, the issues presented by each bill can be better grasped and more intelligently discussed.'" 44 The Missouri Supreme Court similarly asserted that by limiting each bill to a single subject, the rule enables bills to "be easily understood and intelligently discussed, both by legislators and the general public." 45 So, too, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has urged that the general aim of the rule is to "place restraints on the legislative process and encourage an open, deliberative, and accountable government." 46 The intuition is that when a bill is limited to a single subject, it is easier for legislators to more fully understand the ramifications of enactment and for the public to know what their legislators are up to.
That can facilitate public input while the measure is pending, or voter efforts to hold legislators accountable after enactment. Supporters of the rule have also expressed the hopeful assumption that it will "prevent surprise and fraud upon the people and the 42 In re Initiative Petition No. 382, supra, 142 P.3d at 405. Accord, Porten Sullivan, supra, 568 A.2d at 1121 ("to avoid the necessity for a legislator to acquiesce in a bill he or she opposes in order to secure useful and necessary legislation"). 43 Illinois Supreme Court agreed that "[t]he subject may be as broad as the legislature chooses," 52 albeit not "so broad that the rule is evaded as a meaningful constitutional check on the legislature's actions" 53 perhaps not the most helpful formula. Indeed, some state courts have approved as constitutionally permissible subjects such broad topics as "land," 54 "education," 55 "transportation," 56 "utilities," 57 "state taxation," 58 "public safety," 59 "capital projects," 60 and "operations of state government." 61 On the other hand, some state high courts have rejected "any broad, expansive, approach," 62 and have ruled out certain relatively broad topics. The Maryland Court of Appeals concluded that the purpose of "generally regulating corporations is too broad and too tenuous" to satisfy the single-subject requirement." 63 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has held that "municipalities" is "too broad to qualify for single-subject status" 64 and, similarly, that "refining civil remedies or relief" and "judicial remedies and sanctions" are "far too expansive" to satisfy the single-subject requirement 65 --although the same court also held that the "regulating of gaming" was sufficiently narrow as to be a constitutionally permissible subject. 66 Some state constitutional provisions authorize acceptance of some inherently broad measures, like appropriations and budget bills, codifications, and comprehensive revisions, and some courts similarly recognized that such sweeping multi-part measures can constitute a single subject. However, difficulties have arisen when substantive law provisions are attached to appropriations bills 67 and also in defining what constitutes a permissible comprehensive approach. Thus, state courts have divided over whether comprehensive tort reform constitutes a single subject. The Alaska Supreme Court, which has generally accepted a broad definition of subject, upheld a single tort reform law that imposed caps on noneconomic and punitive damages, required payment of half of all punitive damages awards to the state, created a statute of repose, adopted a comparative allocation of fault between parties and nonparties, provided for a revised offer of judgment procedure, and gave hospitals partial immunity from vicarious liability for some physicians' actions. 68 The court acknowledged that the law's provisions "concern different matters" but concluded that "they are all within the single subject of 'civil action.'" 69 The similarly struggled over the significance of the length or number of sections of a bill or the number of articles or titles of the state code that the measure amends. Although longer, more complex bills are certainly more likely to be found to violate the single-subject constraint, the fact that the bill amends only a single article or title will not save it, 72 has both invalidated a law authorizing a single state agency to incur debt to finance three different projects, 79 while a few years later upholding a law authorizing a different state agency to issue bonds to finance four different projects 80 --both times without dissent.
Although the second decision sought to distinguish the first by finding the common theme of turnpike construction and maintenance linked the multiple projects, 81 the tension between the decisions remains.
B. Germaneness
As the Oklahoma turnpike decision indicates, the question in many single subject cases is not the definition of "subject" per se, but whether the different topics, sections, or parts of a bill are sufficiently closely connected that they can be treated as dealing with a single subject. As the Ohio Supreme Court put it, the rule "allows a plurality of topics" even as it bars a "disunity of subjects." 82 related;" 83 whether there is a "unifying principle," 84 "natural and logical connection," 85 or a "common purpose or relationship . . . between the topics;" 86 "whether they have a nexus to a common purpose;" 87 whether they "fairly relate to the same subject" 88 or "relate, directly or indirectly, to the same general subject and have a mutual connection;" 89 whether there is a "common thread" 90 or "filament" 91 linking them to each other, orfrom the opposite perspective -whether they are "distinct and incongruous" 92 or "dissimilar and discordant." 93 The most commonly used judicial standard is whether they are "germane" or "reasonably germane" to each other or to some general subject. 94 Of course, as other commentators have recognized, "reasonable germaneness" is not much more precise or determinate than "subject" itself. 95 The body of law the courts have produced as they have grappled with the question of whether the different parts of a bill are germane to each other or to some overarching subject is not much more consistent than the jurisprudence concerning permissible subjects.
Thus, courts have found sufficient germaneness in laws that combine a tax on motor vehicle fuels with authorization of bonds to finance highway construction; 96 add an authorization of a park district to acquire land to a bill making appropriations for state government; 97 combine an authorization of the privatization of liquor sales with funding for public safety; 98 for an intentional workplace tort. 111 There may be a principle that explains the different findings of connection or germaneness across the cases, but it is not easy to discern.
C. Judicial Deference
Most courts have declared that they will take a deferential approach to the legislature, adopting a "liberal interpretation" of the meaning of "subject" and of the degree of connectedness among a bill's parts necessary to satisfy the germaneness standard. included in the statute under review." 112 High courts in Alaska, 113 Illinois, 114 Kansas, 115 Maryland, 116 Missouri, 117 Minnesota, 118 Ohio 119 and other states have similarly taken the position that they will strike down laws on single subject grounds only if the violation is "clearly, plainly, and palpably so," "manifestly gross and fraudulent," or shown "beyond a reasonable doubt." 120 The case for such a liberal, deferential approach is clear. It demonstrates respect for a coordinate branch of government. If few, if any, laws are struck down on singlesubject grounds, it minimizes the need for the court to articulate a clear and consistent standard for determining the meaning of "subject" or "germaneness" or to rationalize the different treatment of different cases. And it avoids the extremely knotty question of what to do when a law is determined to violate the rulestrike the whole law down; or sever the section or sections not germane to the other provisions, strike those down, and sustain the rest. 121 On the other hand, judicial deference, with the resulting expansive definitions of subject and germaneness threaten to undermine the single-subject principle and to render a provision of the state constitution a "dead letter." 122 If the purpose of the singlesubject requirement is to reform the operations of the state legislature, it may be odd to leave enforcement of the requirement to the legislature itself. Nor is it clear that enforcement of the rule would be so disrespectful of the legislature. Like other process reforms, the single-subject requirement does not limit the objects of state legislation or the goals of state policy, but only the form of the legislation used to achieve those ends.
There would be no restriction on the legislature enacting separately those measures it could not enact together, and many findings of single-subject violations have been followed by just such separate enactments. 123
In any event, nearly all the courts that have declared themselves committed to a deferential, liberal interpretation of subject have at one time or another struck down laws on single-subject grounds. 124 "There must be limits" 125 --"[t]here comes a point" 126the courts complain, but the rule of liberal-interpretation-up-to-a-point fails to provide a very CSEA v. State, supra, 56 N.E.3d at 920 ("the appropriate remedy when a legislative act violates the one-subject rule is generally to sever the offending portion of the act ;'to cure the defect and save the portions" of the act do relate to a single subject" universities, a tax credit for businesses that contribute to organizations that provide scholarships to low-income students, changes to high school teacher licensing requirements, "performance-based incentives for GED and career education matriculation and enrollment at state universities," and most controversially, changes to the Teacher Due Process Act to remove protections from many elementary and secondary public school teachers concerning the termination or nonrenewal of their contracts. 137 As the court acknowledged, the law contained multiple topics affecting the operations of public schools, benefits for students, state universities, and touched many different government agencies. 138 As the lawsuit by the NEA suggests, there could easily have been opposition to the elimination of teacher due process protections from legislators who favor increased funding for schools. Yet, applying the "policy of liberally construing the one-subject rule," 139 all the measures seemed germane to education and 136 387 P.3d 795 (Kans. 2017). 137 Id. at 798, 803-04. 138 Id. at 808-09. 139 Id. at 808.
"the term 'education' is not so broad that it fails to limit the area in which the legislature Without much analysis 151 the majority simply concluded that the multiple provisions were "unrelated" to each other and that "[m]any . . . have nothing in common." 152 By contrast, the two dissenters emphasized there was a common theme: "the legislature and the public understood the common themes and purposes understood in the legislation; it was tort reform." 153 They also pointed out the legislature had previously enacted, without successful single-subject objection, such broad measures as the ten-article and 368section Uniform Commercial Code, and a 78-section Evidence Code, and that the majority's treatment of the tort reform law would create "substantial difficulty" for the legislature to pass "comprehensive legislation including any uniform codes that are generally adopted among the states." 154 In their view, the "majority opinion gives little 149 302 P.3d 789 (Ok. 2013). 150 Id. at 793-94. 151 The majority devoted five paragraphs to the discussion of the law and the application of the single-subject rule to it, including one that focused solely on whether severance rather than complete invalidation was a possible remedy. Id. 152 guidance" 155 for distinguishing between impermissibly sweeping multi-part laws and acceptable comprehensive ones.
A striking feature of the dueling opinions in Douglas was the Oklahoma justices' focus on the anti-logrolling purpose often invoked to explain and justify the single-subject rule. The majority expressly framed its analysis in light the rule's anti-logrolling purpose. 156 Without citing any specific instances of logrolling in the legislative history, the majority concluded that in a bill with so many different sections and topics, legislators were inevitably "faced with an all-or-nothing choice" which would require them to vote for provisions they did not want "to ensure the passage of favorable legislation." 157 The dissent, however, saw the range of multiple provisions in the bill as evidence of legislative compromise. In any complex measure, "[i]t is likely that some of the legislators who voted in favor or the bill compromised to secure its passage." 158 But in the dissent's view that is a feature and not a bug as "[l]egislation requires some compromise." 159
The division in Douglas points to the possibility of anti-logrolling and the other purposes behind the single-subject rule in providing a more workable standard than the text of the rule itself for applying the rule, as well as the difficulties in doing so. That is the focus of the next Part.
IV. From Text to Purpose: Anti-Logrolling and Anti-Riders as Standards for
Enforcement 155 Id. at 802 156 Id. at 792. 157 Id. at 793. 158 Id. at 803. 159 Id.
Like the Oklahoma judges in Douglas, many courts and commentators have sought to resolve the intractable question of how to define "subject" by turning to the purposes long seen as explaining and justifying the single-subject rule: prevention of logrolling and riders, and more generally protection of the legislative process from are often characterized as improper manipulations. 160 Logrolling, in particular, has long been condemned. Indeed, "in the United States at least, . . . this word has always had pejorative connotations." 161 By definition, an act put together by logrolling consists of measures which, considered individually, lacked majority support. Hence, its enactment is often seen as inconsistent with majority rule. Logrolling has been particularly criticized for facilitating the passage of wasteful "Christmas tree" bills and pork-barrel legislation, that is, laws that provide concentrated benefitstypically, subsidies; tax breaks; restrictive licensing requirements; tariffs; and roads, harbors and other highly targeted infrastructure investmentsto a small number of interests but impose broader costs on consumers and taxpayers. 162 The notorious Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 is often cited as an example of how logrolling enables the coalition backing the law to win benefits for its benefits for the special interest groups promoting the tariff, at a cost to the nation as a whole. 163 Some courts, like the Oklahoma Supreme Court and the Maryland Court of Appeals, have also emphasized the way in which such a logroll coerces legislators to vote for provisions they do not actually support or against a provision they would otherwise support because it has been combined with measures they oppose. 164 An early application of the single-subject rule by the Michigan Supreme Court to strike down an act that appropriated state funds for the improvement of three different state roads is a classic example of the anti-logrolling philosophy at work. As Chief Justice Thomas Cooley explained, the roads were "distinct objects of legislation which might, with entire propriety, have been provided for by separate acts, and indeed, ought to have been, in view of the care which is taken by the Constitution to compel each distinct object of legislation to be considered separately. These objects have certainly no necessary connection, and being grouped together in one bill, legislators are not only preclude[d] from expressing by their votes their opinion on each separately; but they are so united, as to invite a combination of interests among the friends of each, in order to secure the success of all, when, perhaps, neither could be passed separately. The evils of that species of omnibus legislation which the constitution designed to prohibit, are all invited by acts thus framed." 165 Despite this longstanding hostility to legislation by logrolling, modern scholarship has recognized that logrollingor, less pejoratively, vote-tradingmay actually be socially desirable because it recognizes that legislators have different intensities of preference for different measures. A proposal may enjoy only minority support not so much because the majority is actively hostile to it but rather because the majority is largely indifferent or only weakly opposed. Logrolling allows legislators to obtain passage of the measures they more strongly support at the modest price of voting for measures they are apathetic about or only mildly oppose. As a result, logrolling can make more legislators better off. To the extent legislators accurately represent the interests of their constituents, logrolling can 164 See, e.g., Thomas v. Henry, 260 P.3d 1251, 1260 (Ok. 2011) (expressing concern that with logrolling "many of those voting on the law would be faxed with an unpalatable all-or-nothing choice"); Porten Sullivan, supra, 568 A.2d at 1121. 165 To be sure, there is no guarantee that logrolling will be welfare-enhancing. The ability of a legislative minority to advance its goals through logrolling will depend on the skills, information, and resources of the legislators. 167 And the majority put together by logrolling might still impose costs on the community as a whole that are greater than the benefits to the logrolling coalition. But it is fair to say that there is no reason to assume that majorities put together by logrolling categorically impose net social costs or that they are more net costly than majorities composed of a single group. 168 It is even more unlikely that courts will be able to tell the difference. 169 Of course, even if the prejudice against logrolling is mistaken, that alone might not matter for challenging the role of a concern about logrolling in applying the single-subject rule. The real difficulty is distinguishing improper logrolling from the deal-making and compromises that are "pervasive" in collective bodies and "normally characteristic of 166 The concern that bills that result from logrolling somehow coerce legislators into voting against their preferences seems even weaker than the claim that bills composed of provisions that might not have passed on their own violates proper legislative norms.
Compromise necessarily involves votes at odds with one's ideal position. As Professor Dan Lowenstein crisply put it: "Most choices in life involve trade-offs." 177 Or as one member of Congress noted in early February 2019 in explaining his vote for the bill that prevented the recurrence of a second partial government shutdown, "When you strike a deal you get some things you want and you get some things that you don't like." 178 In theory, the case against riders may be stronger than the case against logrolling. By definition, a rider is attached to a bill that already enjoys majority support so that its backers should not have had to vote for the rider in order to get their measure enacted.
Michael Gilbert speculates that riders are more likely to result from the ability of powerful individual legislators to manipulate rules and procedures to get their particular proposals attached to a popular bill and to block efforts to strip the rider out. 179 In his view, riders are always anti-majoritarian and, by definition, leave a majority of legislators worse off as they would have preferred to vote for the bill in question without the rider. 180 He would reframe the single-subject rule exclusively around the prevention of riders. 181 Yet, in practice, it may be difficult to distinguish a rider from a logroll. As the earliest study of the single-subject rule found, determining whether a provision is a rider is a "troublesome question." 182 Before enactment, a bill's proponents may be unsure whether the measure actually enjoys majority support or is, instead, a few votes short of passage and so is willing to accept an amendment that brings along a few more votes. Is such a provision a logroll or a rider? 183 Assessing the provisions of an act after enactment, a court trying to distinguish a logroll from a rider "would have to make unseemly, and possibly difficult judgments about the relative popularity of various provisions and the motivations of the sponsors." 184 Indeed, a close assessment of Illinois's Wirtz decision concluded that "the attempt to distinguish between the two [logrolling and riders] may be futile." 185 The fact that a provision, subsequently folded into a bigger bill, did not pass on its own does not make it a rider. 186 And even critics of riders recognize that, like logrolls, they can be socially beneficial and make net contributions to social well-being. 187
Several judges taking a legislative-process-focused approach to the single-subject rule have emphasized that the troublesome sections of a billwhether logroll or rider -were added at the "last minute" or the "eleventh hour." 188 This underscores the singlesubject rule's purposes of making sure that legislators are able to understand and deliberate what they are voting on measures and that the legislative process is transparent to the broader the public to keep track of legislative action. This emphasis on surprising late in the process additions also implies some kind of legislative chicanery that would support a judicial decision to strike down a measure. However, many state legislatures operate under requirements of time-limited legislative sessions. 189 Some of these are as short as twenty to thirty legislative days or sixty to ninety calendar days; 190 in four states, the legislature meets only for a limited number of days every other year. 191 Frequent amendments to pending legislation are surely a part of the legislative process to begin with. 192 But tight session limits put a lot of pressure to get the legislative business done in a very short period and make it even more likely that there will be a rush of amendments, combinations of previously separate measures into bigger bills, and a surge of deal-making as the end of the legislative session approaches. From the perspective of an idealized, orderly and deliberative legislative process, this is surely unfortunate. But, as one Ohio Supreme Court justice observed, however "distasteful" and "ugly" the process may be, that does not make it unconstitutional. 193 It is difficultprobably impossibleto quarrel with the goals of improved deliberation, transparency, and accountability norms. The real issues are whether attention to those concerns, and the logrolls and riders said to violate them, helps determine what is a subject and when is the single-subject rule violated. There can be logrolls and riders within a single subject, and omnibus or multi-part bills which are put together for convenience or for the comprehensive treatment of a subject. Indeed. in at least some circumstances, legislative deliberation, effective law-making, transparency and public accountability may be better served by multi-part bills that comprehensively address a complex or multifaceted problem 194 as by narrower measures that address the issues piecemeal. Improper manipulations of the legislative processif they can be judicially identifiedmay be evidence that a new law goes beyond a single subject, but it is not clear that even a close review of the legislative process can resolve the meaning of "subject."
V. Conclusion
The single-subject rule presents a paradox. It is "part of the fundamental structure of legislative power articulated in [the] constitution" 195 of the vast majority of states, and it reflects and seeks to promote a noble vision of deliberative, majoritarian, and accountable law-making. But it has proven all but impossible to consistently implement, or even to consistently define. Although some commentators have criticized the courts for excessive deference to the legislatures and have urged that more aggressive enforcement will improve legislative performance, that seems unlikely to occur. The problems of subject definition and consistent application would only get worse with more aggressive enforcement efforts. Nor is it clear that more aggressive enforcement would affect legislative behavior. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has taken a more stringent approach than many other state courts and has frequently struck down laws on single-subject grounds but the legislature continues to pass laws the court finds objectionable, leading the court to complain of "growing weary of admonishing the Legislature for so flagrantly violating the Oklahoma Constitution." 196
The single-subject rule's view of relatively tidy, separate topic-by-topic deliberation and enactment is often in tension with the coalition-building and deal-making necessary for the legislative process to work in practice. Comprehensive, multi-topic legislation will often be necessary, if not desirable, in order for the legislature to act at all, and a proliferation of small, piecemeal measures that would result from the strict construction of the single-subject rule would not improve legislative efficiency or, given the time limits many legislatures are under, legislative deliberation.
Having been a part of the constitutions of most states for roughly a century and a half, suggests that a judicially-enforceable constitutional requirement may not be the best way to achieve those ends.
